(1)
The expectation in (1) is over the coin flips of the mechanism.
The class of valuations of interest here is the following (as in [2] ). This definition also captures positive combinations of weighted rank functions, as the cones generated by weighted and unweighted rank functions of matroids coincide.
The allocation rule of [2] is maximal-in-distributional-range, provides a (1 − 1/e)-approximation to the social welfare, and the corresponding TIE mechanism can be implemented in expected polynomial time provided the bidders' valuations are weighted matroid rank sums and support lottery-value queries. Our goal here is to prove the following. We prove this claim in two steps. First, we prove the following. Therefore, by selecting a sufficiently (polynomially) small ǫ in Theorem 1.5, we can achieve an arbitrarily (polynomially) small error ǫ in Theorem 1.4.
An Approximately MIDR Allocation Rule
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.5. We use a variant of the mechanism of [2] . Instead of sophisticated convex optimization techniques, which seem necessary to find the exact optimum over the range, we use a simple local search that guarantees that we get arbitrarily close to the optimum. We begin with some definitions.
Definition 2.1. For a combinatorial auction with m items and n bidders with valuations
,
→ R + to be the multilinear extension of f (see also [5] ), and P to be the polytope of fractional allocations:
The (integral) welfare maximization problem turns out to be equivalent to max{F (x) : x ∈ P }. This problem cannot be solved optimally, even for very special classes of valuation functions. In lieu of F , the authors of [2] use the modified objective function
Interestingly, the function F exp turns out to be concave for a subclass of submodular functions, including weighted matroid rank sums (see [2] for a proof). This means that we can solve the problem max{F exp (x) : x ∈ P }, which means in effect optimizing over a certain range of product distributions. Also, the optimum of this problem is at least (1 − 1/e) times the optimal social welfare. Supplementing this MIDR allocation rule with suitable payments yields a (1 − 1/e)-approximate, TIE mechanism [2] .
Here, we propose the following simple algorithm that solves the problem max{F exp (x) : x ∈ P } nearoptimally (in the sense of an FPTAS).
Local Search Allocation Rule.
• Initialize x := 0. Let M be the maximum value of any singleton.
• Let g be an estimate of the gradient ∇F exp (x), within additive error δM in each coordinate, where δ = ǫ 8m 2 n 2 . As long as there is a point y ∈ P such that
• Return an allocation randomly sampled from the distribution x.
The required estimates of ∇F exp (x) can be obtained in polynomial time by random sampling, with high probability. (By high probability, we mean 1 − e −poly(m,n) in this manuscript. The coordinates of ∇F exp (x) are always in the interval [0, M ] -by submodularity -and so this follows from standard Chernoff bounds [1] .) Linear programming can be used to efficiently find a suitable point y, or certify that no such point exists.
The analysis
We claim that this allocation rule runs in polynomial time and solves the problem max{F exp (x) : x ∈ P } up to a (1 − ǫ) factor with high probability, thus proving Theorem 1.5. In the following, we assume that the estimate of ∇F exp (x) obtained in each step is accurate within additive error δM , which is possible to achieve with high probability over the run of the algorithm, via a polynomial number of samples.
We proceed via a series of claims.
Lemma 2.2. If the algorithm terminates, then with high probability
Proof. Let y be an optimal solution of max{F exp (x) : x ∈ P }. When the algorithm terminates at x, we have (y − x) · ∇F exp (x) < ǫM (even accounting for the errors in our estimate of ∇F exp (x)). By the concavity of 
by known properties of the multilinear extension [5, 6] . This implies that for any
Consequently,
Again using δ = ǫ 8m 2 n 2 , we obtain
Lemma 2.4. The number of iterations is with high probability at most 64m 3 n 2 /ǫ 2 .
Proof. By the previous lemma, with high probability the value of F exp (x) increases in each iteration by at least ǫ 2 64m 2 n 2 M . After 64m 3 n 2 /ǫ 2 iterations, it will be at least mM . By the definition of M and submodularity of valuations, mM is an upper bound on the welfare of every feasible allocation, and hence also of the function F exp . This completes the proof.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.5. We remark that, building on the allocation rule in [3] , a similar approach gives a (1−ǫ)-MIDR and (1−1/e−ǫ)-approximate allocation rule for combinatorial public projects with weighted matroid rank sums that runs in polynomial time in the value oracle model.
From Approximately MIDR to Approximately TIE
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.6. We assume that we have a (1 − ǫ)-MIDR allocation rule M providing a c-approximation for combinatorial auctions with valuations in a class C. We assume in the following that c ≥ 1 n , where n is the number of bidders. (A 1 n -approximation is trivial to achieve by giving all of the items to a random bidder.) We also assume that ǫ = 1/poly(m, n). We want to convert the (1−ǫ)-MIDR allocation rule into an (1 − ǫ ′ )-TIE mechanism. Our approach is as follows. If ǫ = 0, then the VCG payment scheme turns an MIDR mechanism into a TIE mechanism. The fact that our mechanism is only approximately MIDR means that the VCG payments might suffer from errors that are significant for certain bidders, especially if their utility is close to zero. Therefore, we modify the mechanism to ensure that bidders whose valuation is very low do not participate in the VCG scheme. In addition, we provide each bidder with the bundle of all items with some small probability, so that their expected utility is not extremely small. Our mechanism works as follows.
2. Let V i be the valuation that bidder i reports for the ground set of all items. Run M to compute a distribution over allocations (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and let O i be an (unbiased) estimate of the expected value collected by bidder i,
O i be an estimate of the expected social welfare
Call bidder i active if he is relevant and, in addition,
4. With probability 1 − 1/n: allocate a set S i from the distribution found by M to each active bidder i, and charge the VCG-like price
Do not allocate or charge anything to inactive bidders.
5. Else, with probability 1/n 2 for each bidder i: If active, allocate the ground set to i and charge 
j =i V j ; this happens with exponentially small probability. Hence, by lying, bidder i could possibly gain only an exponentially small fraction of V * i in expectation, negligible with respect to his utility as an inactive player. Lemma 3.2. For every bidder i such that
1 By polynomially bounded sampling, we can assume that our estimate O i is with high probability within E[v i (S i )] ± V i /poly(m, n), and the probability of deviation decays exponentially. Similarly for the estimates of O and O ′ −i . 
Proof. We have V
Here we used the fact that OP T +i is the optimal value over the range with valuations v * i and v j , j = i. This implies that the last quantity, U + active , is the best possible utility bidder i could receive as an active bidder. In fact he will receive this utility if he reports truthfully and ends up being active.
If bidder i is inactive, then his expected utility will be
Now, if it is the case that
this means that no matter what bidder i reports, being active cannot be more profitable than not being active for him. When reporting his true valuation, such a bidder will in fact be inactive, because the condition for making a bidder active is exactly On the other hand, if
then it is more profitable for bidder i to be active, since by reporting truthfully he will get utility U + active , better than U inactive as an inactive bidder. In fact we argued above that an active bidder cannot get a better utility by reporting any valuation, so the best strategy for him is to report truthfully. In conclusion, the idealized mechanism rewards a truthfully reporting bidder by utility max{U 
] are strongly concentrated, let's say with high probability within ǫ j =i V j = O(ǫn 7 V * i ) of the expectation. Also, the actual social welfare of the distribution returned by the mechanism when bidder i reports truthfully is within O(ǫn 7 V * i ) of OP T +i in expectation. Therefore, the expected utility of a truthfully reporting bidder is at least max{U
On the other hand, the expected utility under any other reported valuation cannot be better than max{U
, again due to the precision of the estimates stated above. We have also ensured that the bidder's utility is at least 1 2n 2 V * i . Therefore, the relative error in utility maximization is O(ǫn 9 ).
Now we can prove Theorem 1.6.
Proof. Using a (1 − ǫ)-MIDR mechanism M, we implement a new mechanism M ′ as above. By Lemma 3.1 and 3.3, each bidder maximizes his utility within a factor of 1 − O(ǫ · poly(n)) by reporting truthfully. Moreover, the expected social welfare provided by mechanism M ′ is at least (1 − 1/n) times the social welfare of all active bidders in M. (Just considering the option that we used the VCG-based allocation.) It remains to estimate the loss in social welfare due to inactive bidders.
Consider a bidder i such that
is a strongly concentrated estimate, with high probability we also have V i ≥ 2 n 2 O ′ −i . Therefore, with high probability the bidder will be active and participate in the VCG scheme. The only bidders who do not participate with significant probability are those such that
Therefore, all such bidders together cannot amount to more than 4 n OP T . Overall, we recover at least a (1 − O(1/n))-fraction of the social welfare achieved by mechanism M, which means an approximation factor at least (1 − O(1/n))c. It is easy to see that the O(1/n) term can be replaced by any inverse polynomial in m, n, if desired.
#P-hardness of Lottery Value Queries
Here we show that for matroid rank functions, lottery-value queries are #P-hard to answer, and require an exponential number of queries if the matroid is given by an independence oracle. We note that a lottery-value query for the vector x = ( Proof. We use the class of "paving matroids" [4] : Let E be a ground set of size 2m partitioned into disjoint pairs e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e m , and let F ⊂
[m] k be any family of k-element subsets of [m] . Then the following is a matroid: S ⊆ E is independent iff either |S| < 2k, or |S| = 2k and S is not a union of pairs i∈F e i where F ∈ F .
Using this construction, we can embed any #P-hard problem in a paving matroid M. For example, consider the problem of counting perfect matchings. For a graph G with m edges and n vertices, we let k = n/2 and we define F to be the family of k-edge subsets of edges that form a perfect matching. Then the matroid M defined as above captures the structure of perfect matchings, since for any set of edges F the rank function r M (F ) tells us whether F is a perfect matching (which is the case if and only if r M ( i∈F e i ) = 2|F | − 1 = 2k − 1). Also, the matroid is succintly represented by the graph G, in the sense that given G we can easily decide whether a given set is independent in M or not. The value of r M (S) depends on the structure of S only if S is a union of k pairs e i , otherwise it is r M (S) = min{|S|, 2k}. Therefore, if we can compute the value of E[r M (R)] = 2 −2m S⊆[2m] r M (S), we can extract the number of perfect matchings by an elementary formula.
Similarly, for a paving matroid given by an independence oracle, the value of E[r M (R)] determines the size of the family F , which could be any arbitrary family. We cannot compute this value unless we determine the size of F , which requires querying all sets of the form i∈F e i . This requires an exponential number of queries for independence in M.
